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1. Introduction: When the Dollar Overtook the Pound 
 
 In the aftermath of the Second World War, the dollar emerged as the uncontested 
leader among international currencies, a development of historic significance.  In 1899 the 
share of the pound in known foreign exchange holdings of official institutions had been 
more than twice the total of the next nearest competitors, the franc and the mark, and much 
greater than the dollar.1   Even as late as 1940, the level of foreign-owned liquid sterling 
assets was still double the level of foreign-owned liquid dollar assets.  By 1945, however, 
the position of the dollar and pound, as measured by this statistic, had precisely reversed.2  
The war itself -- including US lending, UK borrowing and other consequences -- had 
completed the dollar's rise to ascendancy.    
 
 The reversal reflected long-run trends in economic fundamentals that had already 
been underway since the late 19th century.   The US economy surpassed the British economy 
in size in 1872.3   US exports did not pull ahead of UK exports until 1915.   The 
development of the financial system lagged behind; one reflection is that the United States 
did not establish a central bank until 1913.  During the years following 1914, the US passed 
from net debtor to net creditor while the UK moved in the opposite direction.  This had 
much to do with British borrowing from the United States so as to fight World War I.   The 
dollar was the only currency to remain convertible into gold at a fixed price into the 1920s.4    
As it emerged as a major international currency, its use in international trade and finance 
widened increasingly.  That the pound retained its dominant position as key currency in the 
interwar period was primarily due to inertia in such arrangements.  But by 1945 the 
dethroning was complete. 
 
 The decline in the pound was clearly part of a larger pattern whereby the United 
Kingdom lost its economic pre-eminence, colonies, military power, and other trappings of 
international hegemony.   As some wonder whether the United States might now have 
embarked on a path of “imperial over-reach,” following the British Empire down a road of 
widening budget deficits and overly ambitious military adventures in the Muslim world, the 
fate of the pound is perhaps a useful caution.   The Suez crisis of 1956 is frequently recalled 
as the occasion on which Britain was forced under US pressure to abandon its remaining 
                                                 
 
1   $105.1 million in pounds, $27.2m in francs, $24.2m in marks, and $9.4 in other currencies.   In 
1913, the ranking was the same: $425.4 million in pounds, $275.1m in francs, $136.9m in marks, 
and $55.3 in other currencies.  Lindert (1969, p.16-22). 
2 Aliber (1966, p.19-20). 
3 In real terms --1990 International Gheary-Kamis dollars. 
4 E.g., Nurkse (1944), Bergsten ( 1975, p.53), and Eichengreen (1992). 
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imperial designs.  But the important role played by a simultaneous run on the pound, and the 
American decision not to help the beleaguered currency, should also be remembered.5   
 
2.  Measuring the dollar’s international role 
  
 In the 1990s, the question arose whether the dollar was in the process of losing its 
role as unrivaled international currency, as had the pound before it.6   The yen and mark had 
gained steadily during the 1970s and 1980s, as measured by shares in central banks’ 
holdings of foreign exchange reserves, at the dollar’s expense.  The strong fundamentals of 
the Japanese and German economies, particularly their current account surpluses and low 
inflation rates, constituted an obvious explanation.    
 
 But the facts in the 1990s suggested that the right answer to the question was “no.”   
Observers had confused a fall in the foreign exchange value of the dollar (1985-1995), with 
a fall in its international role.   In reality, the Japanese and German economies and their 
respective currencies remained far behind the United States and the dollar.   Furthermore, 
the dollar’s share in reserves actually rose throughout the 1990s, as Figure 1 shows.7   The 
dollar was also in demand in other respects, for example as a transactions currency in Latin 
America and wherever else in the world people had lost faith in their own currencies. 
 
                                                 
5 E.g., Boughton (2001) and “From Suez to Baghdad,” Charlemagne, The Economist, March 22, 
2003, p. 47.   The prime minister was told that the US would likely not support British plans to go 
to the IMF for support of the pound. 
6 Kindleberger (1995, p.6) and Kunz (1995) are among those who “cried wolf.”  The February 25, 
1995, issue of The Economist included an article and leader arguing that "the dollar's dominance is 
waning," at the expense of the DM in particular.   Others, such as Hale (1995), saw the yen as the 
challenger. 
7 The ratios based upon the COFER data assume 70% of the reserves not identified are held in 
dollars, and 25%  in euros. See the discussion at the end of Section 6 for more detail. 
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Figure 1: Reserves held by central banks as shares of total – 3 major currencies 
(revised IMF data spliced into old data after 1979, and COFER data starting 1995). 
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Now the question, “Is the dollar in danger of losing its exclusive role as premier 
international currency?” comes up yet again.  But this time the answer may be “yes.”   
The primary reason is that the euro now exists as a more serious potential rival than the 
mark or yen were.   A secondary reason is that the US by now has a 25-year history of 
chronic current account deficits and the dollar has a 35-year history of trend depreciation. 
 
 There are various possible criteria of international currency status:  use of currencies 
to invoice trade, to denominate debt and loans, and so forth.  We focus on reserve currency 
holdings for two reasons.   First, annual data for all relevant currencies are available over the 
last three decades or more;   the other international roles are nowhere near as 
comprehensively quantifiable.  A second reason for focusing on the reserve currency role is 
that it is more relevant than the others to the important questions of whether the United 
States will continue to be able to finance its current account deficit. 
 
 That being said, the same factors that determine the holdings of reserve currencies 
are similar to those that affect other aspect of international currency status, such as the usage 
of currencies for invoicing of trade in goods and assets.  This point is useful to keep in mind 
as we proceed through our analysis.8 
 
                                                 
8   Goldberg and Tille (2006), for example, argue that invoicing in commodities is in dollars 
because of the lower transactions costs associated with transacting in dollars. But this lower cost 
is not immutable.  The choice of a currency to use in the invoicing of trade and the holding of 
transactions balances depends upon the macroeconomic volatility associated with various 
currencies.  If the dollar becomes less desirable to hold, the euro could eventually become the 
currency associated with lower transactions costs.     
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3. Reserve Currency Determinants 
 
 We seek empirically to ascertain the determinants of international reserve currency 
shares in the past, in order to ascertain the conditions and timing under which the euro might 
possibly surpass the dollar in the future.9  We use as our data base the period 1973-98, 
before the advent of the euro.   The exercise is largely parameter estimation and 
calibration, without a lot of hypothesis-testing.  In other words we need to squeeze a lot 
out of a small sample and so we intentionally impose some a priori information.  
 
The literature on what determines reserve currency status is fairly well-established, if 
often lacking in quantification.   Three key points.   
(1) Determinants.  There is a list of determining factors, which appears subsequently, in 
section 5 below.  The most important is the size of the country or region in which the 
currency is indigenously used, but there are others as well.   
(2) Network externalities or economies of scale and scope are important.   Each country is 
more likely to use whatever currency is used by others.  Thus international currency use is 
not linear in the determinants.  Rather, there may be a tipping phenomenon: if one currency 
were to draw even and surpass another, the derivative of reserve currency use with respect to 
its determining variables would be higher in that range than in the vicinity of zero or in the 
range when the leading currency is unchallenged.   In that sense the switch happens 
rapidly.10  
(3) In the chronological sense, however, the switch happens slowly.   Whatever currency has 
been used in the past will continue to be used in the future.   Thus inertia is great. 
 
 We thus have three tasks: (1) ascertain the most important determinants and their 
relative weights, (2) confirm that the function is non-linear and settle on an appropriate 
functional form, and (3) estimate the extent of inertia, which we will represent by means of a 
lagged endogenous variable.  Our data come from reserve currency holdings of central 
banks over the period 1973-1998.  One cannot be confident that any given data set will 
contain enough information to answer the questions of interest.  Unfortunately the available 
data do not extend anywhere near far back enough in history to observe the fall of the pound 
from its number one position of a century ago.  But the beginning of our data set does 
capture the mark passing the pound for the number two slot, which may be a useful data 
point for addressing the tipping phenomenon, item (2).   We hope that there is enough 
variation among the other currencies and across the other years to obtain useful estimates of 
parameters of interest under categories (1) and (3). 
  
 The disappearance of the mark, franc and guilder in 1999, and their replacement 
by the euro, constitute an irreparable break in the data series.  But we turn this obstacle to 
advantage.   We obtain a check on the meaningfulness of the equation that was estimated 
                                                 
9     This represents an updating of the estimation in Chinn and Frankel (2007).  That paper 
elaborated on the econometrics. 
10   As Eichengreen (2005) points out, counteracting the arguments about network externalities 
and tipping, particularly in determining the reserve currency function, is an argument in favor or 
multiple simultaneous international currencies: competition for the affections of investors.     
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on pre-1999 data by seeing whether it successfully predicts the direction of movement 
over the period 1999-2007.   Then we use the equation to forecast the path of the 
currency shares of the dollar, euro, and other international currencies into the future, as a 
function of several different possible scenarios regarding, for example, what additional 
countries eventually join EMU.   While we never expected to predict that the euro could 
overtake the dollar anytime soon, we entered this exercise with an open mind regarding 
whether the euro might overtake the dollar in the longer term. 
 
4. International Use of the Euro So Far 
 
Of the various indicators of international currency use, the sort that is available on 
the timeliest basis is the currency of denomination in cross-border financial transactions.  
The euro soon after its debut came into wide use to denominate bonds.  Within Europe 
there was a tremendous increase in issues of corporate bonds, denominated in euros, 
together with a rapid integration of money markets, government bond markets, equity 
markets, and banking.  While the frenetic activity seemed to be related to the debut of the 
euro, it does not meet the definition of “international currency use,” because it is taking 
place inside the currency’s home region.11 
 
Outside Europe, the euro has been a success as well.   Detken and Hartmann 
(2000) studied the data from the euro’s first year in operation, doing a careful job of 
netting out intra-euro-area holdings in order to be able to trace back a measure of euro-
precursor currencies for five years before 1999 that is comparable with post-1999 
numbers.  They found more of an increase in the supply of euro-denominated assets 
outside of Europe than an increase in demand..      The stock of international debt 
denominated in euros increased from about 20 percent on the eve of EMU,  to 30 percent 
in 2003  (Rey, 2005,  p. 114).   
 
When the euro arrived, although its share approximately equaled the sum of the 
shares of the mark, French franc and guilder the year before EMU, it was less than what 
one would get by adding in the share of ECUs (European Currency Units).    This is to be 
expected:  before 1999, the twelve central banks had to hold foreign exchange reserves, 
including of each others’ currencies; these disappeared at the stroke of a pen on January 
1, 1999.    One cannot simply compare pre- and post-1999 figures to learn if the advent of 
the euro has hurt the attractiveness of the dollar as international reserve currency.  The 
euro’s share in central banks’ foreign exchange reserves reached 19.7% in 2003 and has 
grown steadily thereafter.12    
 
                                                 
11 Gaspar and Hartmann (2005), and Rey (2005). 
 
12 There have been substantial revisions in the estimated euro shares. For instance, in November 
2003 the IMF revised the 2002 estimate from 14.6% to 18.7 %. (IMF, 2003; ECB, 2003.); in the 
2004 Annual Report, the 2002 share is 19.3. The results reported here use the revised data, 
spliced together with the old data before 1980. 
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International use of the euro has grown by other criteria as well.  About half of 
euroland trade with non-euro area residents is invoiced in the new currency.13  The euro’s 
share in international debt securities rose to above 30% (versus below 20% for the pre-
1999 legacy currencies).14   Anecdotal evidence suggests that euro cash is increasingly 
accepted in retail transactions around the world, and dollar bills decreasingly so. 
 
The comprehensive triennial survey of foreign exchange trading volume put 
together by the BIS showed the dollar still easily in first place in 2001, at 85% of all spot 
trades (out of 200%), followed by the euro at 43% and the yen at 26%.15   The same 
ranking holds when one adds in forwards and swaps, and derivatives that are traded over 
the counter.   The next triennial BIS survey, covering April 2004, showed a small gain for 
the euro.   Including also forwards and swaps, the dollar was involved in 89% of all 
transactions, and the euro in 37% in 2004.16    The most recent survey, covering April 
2007, shows the dollar having declined further, to 86 per cent of all traditional 
transactions.   (Meanwhile, in an unheralded come-back, the pound has been closing in 
on the yen for the #3 spot.)  Over-the-counter FX derivative markets tell a stronger story: 
the euro has been gaining share since its creation, and the dollar losing share.17    Figure 2 
illustrates the dollar’s gradual loss of share in total foreign exchange trading, traditional plus 
over-the-counter derivatives. 
 
Figure 2: Currency distribution of reported foreign exchange market turnover 
Percentage shares of average daily turnover in April of each year (Shares sum to 200%).  
Source:  BIS (2007) Foreign exchange and derivatives market activity in 2007, page 11. 
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13 Hartmann (1998).    
14 The annual report of the European Central Bank (2003), from which these statistics come, cites 
data through mid-2003. 
15 To compare foreign exchange trading volume in the euro with volume in its predecessor 
currencies, one must allow for the disappearance of intra-euro12 trading, as in the Detken and 
Hartmann’s (2002, p. 558-559) “simple arithmetic of EMU.”  They find that the observed decline 
is almost fully accounted for in this way. 
16  Bank for International Settlements (2005). 
17  Bank for International Settlements (2007, p.11).    
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 In short, the euro is the number two international currency, ahead of the yen, and 
has rapidly gained acceptance, but is still well behind the dollar, which appears to most 
observers to be comfortably in the number one slot.  We now turn to a consideration of 
the determinants of international currency status.   
 
5. Factors that Suit a Currency for International Currency Status 
 
 The literature on international currencies has identified a number of determining 
variables.18 
 
 (1) Output and trade. The currency of a country that has a large share in international 
output, trade and finance has a big natural advantage.  The U.S. economy is still the world's 
largest in terms of output and trade.  By such measures, Japan should be number 2, ahead of 
Germany.  Alarmist fears of the early 1990s, notwithstanding, it was never very likely that 
Japan, a country with half the population and far less land area or natural resources, would 
surpass the United States in sheer economic size.   But the euro is now the home currency to 
15 countries.19  Their combined economic weight is much greater than Germany alone, or 
Japan.  As of 2007, it was not quite as large as the United States, as Table 1 shows. But 
evaluated at current exchange rates, the value of US GDP apparently fell below that of 
euroland GDP for the first time in early 2008. Very likely, most of the 12 countries that have 
acceded to the EU over the last four years will eventually join EMU, which will boost 
euroland's collective GDP a bit further. If the other three long-time EU members, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark, were to join, euroland would definitively surpass the 
United States in economic size; but that is much less likely to happen.  If any of the larger 
countries do join, it will be at least some years into the future.  Thus the question of relative 
size also depends on the growth rates of the US and European economies.   As an alternative 
to GDP, we have also looked at countries’ trading volume as another indication of their 
relative weights in the world economy. 
 
Table 1:   Economic Size of US vs. Europe 
   2004 2007 
US  
 $ 11.5 
trillion  
$ 13.8 
trillion 
  
Number of 
members 
 Number of 
members 
 
Euro-zone  
 
12 $ 9.0 trillion 13 1/ $ 11.9 
trillion 
EU (post-May 2004) 
  
25 $12.1 
trillion 
27 2/ 
 
$ 16.6 
trillion 
1/ Includes Slovenia, but not Cyprus and Malta, who joined the euro in 2008 
                                                 
18  Among the relevant references are Aliber (1966), Alogoskoufis and Portes (1992), Bergsten 
(1975), Black (1989), Dooley et al. (1989), Eichengreen and Frankel (1996), Eichengreen and 
Mathieson (2000), Frankel (1992, 1995), Kenen(1983), Krugman (1984), Kindleberger (1981), 
Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993),McKinnon (1969, 1979), Portes and Rey (1998), Rey 
(2001), Swoboda (1969), Tavlas (1993),  and Tavlas and Ozeki (1992).   
19 Slovenia joined in January 2007 and Cyprus and Malta in January 2008. 
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2/ Includes Bulgaria and Romania. 
   
 
Figure 3: Currency share vs. GDP (at market rates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (2) The country's financial markets.  To attain international currency status, capital 
and money markets in the home country must be not only open and free of controls, but also 
deep and well-developed.  The large financial marketplaces of New York and London have 
long benefited the dollar and pound relative to the euro and its predecessor the 
deutschemark, as Frankfurt still lag far behind as a financial center.   In our earlier paper, we 
took it for granted that Frankfurt was the current home of the euro.   Under the scenario 
where the UK decided to join EMU, the euro benefited from the double boost on counting 
the UK economy into the size of the euroland economy, and bringing the advantages of 
London’s deep financial markets.   
 
 It is surprisingly difficult to come up with a proxy for size, depth, or development 
that is available for all the financial centers.   We have opted to use as our primary measure 
data on foreign exchange turnover in the respective financial centers:  New York, London, 
Frankfurt, Tokyo, Zurich, etc.   This measure differs from turnover of the currencies (dollar, 
pound, euro, etc.), a variable that would be much more likely to be determined 
simultaneously with the international currency status that we are trying to explain.   It 
captures, for example, the pre-eminence of London, which continues despite the small role 
of the pound.  This measure has the virtue of reflecting to some extent all kinds of 
international financial transactions (both long-term and short-term, banking and securities, 
bonds and equities).   Moreover it is possible to patch together a data set covering the 
desired countries and years -- though but just barely, and with increasing difficulty as one 
goes back through the 1970s.   We also tried an alternative proxy for the size of financial 
centers – the size of the countries’ stock markets. 
 
     (3) Confidence in the value of the currency.  Even if a key currency were used only as a 
unit of account, a necessary qualification would be that its value not fluctuate erratically.  As 
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it is, a key currency is also used as a form in which to hold assets (firms hold working 
balances of the currencies in which they invoice, investors hold bonds issued internationally, 
and central banks hold currency reserves).  Here confidence that the value of the currency 
will be stable, and particularly that it will not be inflated away in the future, is critical.  The 
monetary authorities in Japan, Germany and Switzerland, in the 1970s established a better 
track record of low inflation than did the United States, which helped their bids for 
international currency status.   As recently as the 1980s, the mean and variance of the 
inflation rate in the United States were both higher than in those three hard-currency 
countries, though lower than in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and many other 
countries.20  
 
 Given the good U.S. inflation performance in the 1990s, this is no longer such a 
concern as it was formerly.  A more important negative for the dollar is the fact that the 
United States is now a large-scale debtor country.  Even if the Federal Reserve never 
succumbs to the temptations or pressures to inflate away the U.S. debt, the continuing U.S. 
current account deficit is always a likely source of downward pressure on the dollar.  Such 
fears work to make dollars unattractive.  
 
 (4) Network externalities.  An international money, like domestic money, derives its 
value because others are using it.  It is a classic instance of network externalities.  In this 
sense, the intrinsic characteristics of a currency are of less importance than the path-
dependent historical equilibrium.  There is a strong inertial bias in favor of using whatever 
currency has been the international currency in the past.   
 
 One can make an analogy with language.   If one sat down to design an ideal 
language, it would not be English.  (Presumably it would be Esperanto.)   Nobody would 
claim that the English language is particularly well-suited to be the world's lingua franca by 
virtue of its intrinsic beauty, simplicity, or utility. It is neither as elegant and euphonious as 
French, for example, nor as simple and logical in spelling and grammar as Spanish or 
Italian.  Yet it is certainly the language in which citizens of different countries most often 
converse and do business, and increasingly so.  One chooses to use a lingua franca, as one 
chooses a currency, in the belief that it is the one that others are most likely to use.  
 
 Krugman (1984) showed how there can be multiple equilibria in use of an 
international currency, developing some informal ideas of earlier authors such as 
Kindleberger (1981), McKinnon (1979), and Swoboda (1969).  Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and 
Matsui (1993) went to the next level of abstraction analyzing this problem with the theory of 
random matching games.   See also Rey (2001). 
 
 The implication is that small changes in the determinants will not produce 
corresponding changes in the reserve currency numbers, at least not in the short run.  At a 
minimum, changes will show up only with a long lag.  As noted, the pound remained an 
important international currency even after the United Kingdom lost its position as an 
economic superpower early in the century.  In the present context, the inertial bias favors the 
continued central role of the dollar.  Also, as already noted, economies of scale suggest that, 
                                                 
20 E.g., Tavlas and Ozeki (1991). 
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even in the long run, measures of international currency use may not be linear in the 
determinants.   There may be a tipping phenomenon when one currency passes another. 
 
 Another aspect of the network externalities is economies of scope. An individual 
(exporter, importer, borrower, lender, or currency trader) is more likely to use a given 
currency in his or her transactions if everyone else is doing so.  If a currency is widely used 
to invoice trade, it is more likely to be used to invoice financial transactions as well.  If it is 
more widely used in financial transactions, it is more likely to be a vehicle currency in 
foreign exchange trading.   If it is used as a vehicle currency, it is more likely to used as a 
currency to which smaller countries peg.21    And so forth.   In this paper we content 
ourselves with trying to predict reserve currency holdings, with the understanding that 
international usage of a currency is likely to be influenced by the same factors. 
 
6. Econometric estimation of Demand for Reserve Currencies  
 
 We use the IMF annual data on aggregate central bank holdings of the relevant 
major currencies.  The data are not generally available according to holding of individual 
central banks, because most of them regard this as highly confidential.22 
 
Functional Form 
 
From inspection of Figure 3, it seems apparent that the relationship between 
currency shares and GDP shares is nonlinear. Indeed, the functional form cannot literally 
be linear, because the currency shares are bounded between 0 and 1. A natural way of taking 
into account such a constraint is to use a logistic transformation of the shares variable.23   
The standard logistic transformation is symmetric, and has a maximal slope at share equal 
0.50.    
 
Figure 4 plots the logistic of the currency share against the size variables.  The 
straight line now seems to fit the data much more comfortably, indicating that the logistic 
may be a good guess. 
                                                 
21  In some of our regression tests we tried adding to our list of determinants a measure of the 
popularity of the major currencies for smaller currencies to peg to (as suggested by Eichengreen 
and Mathieson, 2000).   An Asian country that is pegged to the dollar, for example, is likely to 
hold a larger share of its reserves in the form of the dollar.   We recognize that the pegging 
decision may be endogenous, determined simultaneously with the reserve holding decision and 
the various other measures of international currency use.   We did not find a significant positive 
effect.  Perhaps this is just as well;  it saves us the trouble of trying to deal with the endogeneity 
of the pegging decision.  In what follows we emphasize regressions without the pegging-anchor 
variable included.    
22  The IMF data is broken down into aggregate holdings by industrialized countries and 
aggregate holdings by developing countries.     Some have suggested that the first data set is more 
interesting because the reliability of the statistics is higher.   Others have suggested that the 
second data set is more interesting because the G10 countries cannot hold their own currencies as 
reserves.   
23  Logistic = log(share/(1-share)). 
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Figure 4: Logistic share vs. GDP (mkt. rates)  
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Basic Estimation results, 1973-1998 
 
Table 2 reports results of regressions of currency shares against the variables we 
have discussed, when estimation is based on the logistic transformation, which reflects 
the inherent nonlinearity of the problem.  Judged by the number of statistically significant 
coefficients, this functional form is more successful statistically than a linear form.   In all 
instances a lagged endogenous variable is included, to account for partial adjustment, 
which is an important factor. 
 
We can easily summarize the results.   Size of the home country (relative income) 
enters positively, significantly, and robustly.    All three rate-of-return variables appear 
with the hypothesized negative signs:   losses in the value of a currency decrease the 
attractiveness of holding it.  They are statistically significant more often than not, though 
inflation (expressed as the differential vis-à-vis average industrial country inflation) 
shows up more strongly and consistently than does trend depreciation (estimated as 20-
year average rate of change of the value of the currency against the SDR) or exchange 
rate volatility.   Foreign exchange turnover, our measure of the depth of competing 
financial centers shows up with the hypothesized positive sign, but is only statistically 
significant in a minority of tests.   The coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable 
suggests a slow adjustment rate.   Only about 12% of the adjustment to the long run is 
estimated to occur in a single year, implying a half-life of about 5-6 years for the 
adjustment process.     
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Table 2: Panel Regression for Determination of Currency Shares 
 
Dependent variable: logit of currency shares in reserve holdings 
Pre-euro sample (1973-98) 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 
Constant -0.65 -0.49 -0.12 
 [0.15] [0.14] [0.06] 
 
GDP ratio (y) 2.77 2.22 1.04 
 [0.64] [0.62] [0.29] 
 
Inflation differential (π) -2.64   
 [1.16]   
 
Depreciation (Δs)  -1.08 -1.10 
  [1.29] [0.59] 
 
Exratevar (σ) -0.98 -0.58 -1.25 
 [0.57] [0.58] [0.34] 
 
FX Turnover ratio (to) 0.45 0.21 0.43 
 [0.29] [0.30] [0.14] 
 
Lag: logit(share t-1) 0.85 0.88 0.96 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] 
 
N 182 182 156 
Sample 1973-98 1973-98 1973-98 
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.97  0.99  
 
Notes: Dependent variable is logit(share) ≡ log(share/(1-share)).       
All variables are in decimal form.      
GDP at market rates. 
Estimated using OLS.   
Figures in bold face are significant at the 10% level.  
Column [3] omits Japanese yen, and uses cross-section weighted standard errors.  
 
 
A little investigation reveals that the results are particularly sensitive to the 
inclusion of the Japanese yen (which had a strong trend appreciation over the sample 
period, without ever attaining as big an international role as predicted by many). 
Excluding data for Japan yields the results in column [3], in which all variables are 
statistically significant role. 
 
Having shed some valuable light on the relevant variables and functional form, 
we estimate and adopt a two-currency version of the determinants of premier reserve 
currency status.  This stripped down equation is more readily used to focus on predictions 
regarding the dollar-versus-euro choice 24 
                                                 
24 The parameters of the two-currency version are estimated in Table 8 of Chinn and Frankel 
(2007). 
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Post sample test, 1999-2007 
It is useful to assess how our model has done in terms of predicting the trends in 
reserve holdings since the advent of the euro in 1999.25 This is more difficult to do than 
one might think. Since the time we conducted our initial analysis, the IMF has ceased 
reporting reserve holdings in the form it did up to the 2004 annual report. After this point, 
the IMF has not tried to estimate the composition of reserve holdings of those central 
banks that do not report details to the IMF. Instead, IMF’s COFER database now reports 
an “unallocated” category. Unfortunately, from our perspective, this category is quite 
large, accounting for about 26.5% of total reserves.    We have to take a stand on the 
composition of these unallocated reserves. We estimate the dollar share at 70%, and the 
euro share at 25%. 
 
Both the level and the trend of the actual currency shares during 2005-2007 – up 
for the euro and down for the dollar – fit very well the simulation where the rate of 
returns on the currencies were expected to continue their trend of the first four years of 
the decade, as Figure 5 shows.   This gives some grounds for some confidence in what we 
think we have learned from the historical data regarding the relevant variables, functional 
form, and coefficients. 
 
 
 
7. Extrapolation to the future 
 
 The goal is to use the estimated parameters to forecast the shares of the dollar, 
euro, and other currencies in the coming decades.   Under any plausible scenario, the 
dollar will remain far ahead of the euro and other potential challengers for years to come.  
But we want to know if there are plausible scenarios that give a different answer for 20 or 
30 years into the future and, if so, what are the variables that are most important to this 
outcome.   First, two caveats – these are simulations incorporating fairly mechanical 
variations.  There are no interactions between, say, exchange rate depreciation and exchange 
rate volatility.  We do not even attempt to predict the future course of these variables.   
Secondly, the simulations are of course only as good as the parameters that we estimated 
from the historical data, most of which are neither precisely estimated nor entirely stable. 
 
Posited Scenarios 
 
 In our earlier work, we experimented with a variety of scenarios.     Two of them 
produced the result that the euro would gradually gain on the dollar, and that sometime 
early in the 2020s, the system would reach a tipping point, a rapid reversal in which the 
euro would surpass the dollar, which would then settle in at the number two slot.  The 
                                                 
25  In Chinn and Frankel (2007), we assess the out-of-sample forecasting characteristics of the 
pre-euro equations in Table 2 for all five top international currencies during the first five years of 
the post-euro period. We now skip directly to the two-currency model, and update the out-of-
sample forecast by another three years of data. 
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first scenario was that EU countries that are not currently in EMU, of which Great Britain 
is by far the most important for these purposes, would join.26  Even three years ago we 
did not claim that this scenario was a likely one, and it appears even less likely today, 
particularly in light of the good performance of the British economy since the start of 
EMU.  The more likely scenario seemed to be the one under which none but small EU 
members joined the euro – countries that seemed to small to bother taking into account – 
but under which the dollar continued to lose value in the future at the same rate that it had 
in the past.   This scenario produced a flipping of roles between the dollar and euro taking 
place around 2022 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Update of Fig. 12 from Chinn and Frankel (2007), Case 4, Scenario D: 
 Simulation of “UK entry” and continued depreciation of currencies at their 2001-04 rates.  
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On the one hand, one could argue that this scenario was too pessimistic for the 
dollar in two respects:   first, the 2001-2004 rate of dollar depreciation that we used was 
more rapid than the longer-term historical average, and, second, the scenario did not 
allow for likely more rapid economic growth in the US than among European countries.   
On the other hand, one could argue that the scenario has proven to be too optimistic in 
three respects:   First, the dollar has actually depreciated since 2004 at a more rapid rate, 
rather than a slower rate.   Second, European growth prospects now appear not all that 
bad after all, in light of a modest recovery of productivity growth in the meantime in 
Western Europe and in light of the continuing gradual process of accession by countries 
that, though small in GDP per capita, loom larger in terms of both population and growth 
prospects.    
 
                                                 
26  The ten accession countries were assumed to join EMU in 2010, Sweden and Denmark in 2015, and the 
UK in 2020; the US retained its share of world income; and the dollar continued the depreciation 
experienced over the 2001-04 period 
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The third point is potentially the most important, by far.    The measure of 
financial development that we have used until now-- forex turnover in Frankfurt versus 
New York –  probably understates the progress of the euro.  Galati and Woodridge (2006) 
“find that the liquidity and breadth of euro financial markets are fast approaching those of 
dollar markets, and as a result the euro is eroding some of the advantages that historically 
supported the pre-eminence of the US dollar as a reserve currency.”  Three years ago we 
had taken it for granted that the euro would benefit from the depth and liquidity of 
London financial markets if and only if the UK were to join euroland, which we have 
agreed is an unlikely prospect.   (In this we shared the assumption by British 
policymakers, for whom staying out of the euro was presumed to run the danger of 
substantial negative effects on London as a financial center.)    Frankfurt remains far less 
developed as a financial center than London or New York, which in the earlier scenarios 
was perhaps the clearest drag on the euro’s progress as an international currency.    But as 
of today, it appears that London has managed in many respects to become the financial 
center for the euro even while the UK remains outside European Monetary Union.    
 
We now drop from the scenario the idea that the UK, Denmark and Sweden join 
the euro area anytime soon.   We also drop the assumptions that the dollar continues to 
depreciate indefinitely at the 2001-04 rate (let alone the rate of 2004-07).   
  
Our second scenario is the most conservative case:  the dollar in the future 
depreciates only at the rate experienced on average over the 20 years up to end-2007, and 
only the new accession countries join the monetary union. Using the actual market GDP 
levels, exchange rate volatility and trading volumes recorded in 2007, we obtain the 
predictions for the dollar versus the euro illustrated in Figure 6.   In this case, the dollar 
retains its primacy, even as the euro narrows the gap to a 40-60 difference.  
 
Figure 6: Only accession countries join EMU in 2010 (UK stays out),  
and currencies depreciate at the 20-year rate experienced up to 2007. 
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As noted above, the issue of financial depth is important.  Our third scenario 
implements the idea that London, not Frankfurt, is in some sense the true financial center 
of the euro.  It seems implausible, however, to assert that London is entirely devoted to 
providing the liquidity for the euro area. We chose to allocate 20% of London forex 
trading to the euro area.27  Applying this measure of financial depth, we obtain the 
forecast shown in Figure 7.    In this case, the euro overtakes the dollar sometime around 
2015.  
 
These simulations illustrate what sort of combinations of assumptions can drive 
the tipping points in our model. 28 
  
 
Figure 7: Only accession countries join EMU in 2010 (UK stays out), 
but 20% of London turnover counts toward Euro area financial depth,  
and currencies depreciate at the 20-year rates experienced up to 2007. 
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8. Conclusion  
 
 Although our econometric analysis pertains only to the reserve currency role, we 
believe that similar considerations apply to other criteria of international currency status.  
This includes the use of the dollar versus euro as currencies in which to invoice trade, 
denominate debt, hold cash, and conduct foreign exchange transactions.   Consequently, 
                                                 
27 This figure is selected on the basis of the fact that 42% of the total 200% of forex trading in 
London involves the euro on one side of the transaction or the other.  Divided by two equals 21%. 
BIS (2007). 
28 For instance, this forecast presumes, as in Figure 6, dollar volatility remains much higher than 
euro volatility. Assuming that this gap shrinks to that prevailing at end-2003 (as in our previous 
study) would overturn this role reversal.  
* 
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if the dollar were to overtake the euro as a reserve currency, it is natural to conjecture that 
the international usage of the dollar would also be eclipsed by the euro along these other 
dimensions as well.  
 
Possible Implications if the Dollar is Dethroned 
 
In recent years, foreign central banks have financed by accumulation of dollar 
reserves a higher fraction of the US current account deficit, as compared to earlier in the 
decade,when the capital inflows came more from the private sector.   But the US cannot 
necessarily rely on the support of foreign central banks indefinitely.  One reason for this, 
which holds even if China and some oil-exporters continue to keep their currencies 
undervalued, is that they can diversify their currency holdings out of dollars, without 
necessarily allowing appreciation on a trade-weighted basis.   The important point is that 
there now exists a credible rival for lead international reserve currency, the euro, which 
has many of the desirable characteristics of an international currency. This was not true in 
the late 1970s and early 1990s when the press feverishly speculated that the dollar might 
be overtaken by the yen or mark.  
 
It is true that each Asian central bank stands to lose considerably, in the value of its 
current holdings, if dollar sales precipitate a dollar crash. But I agree with Barry 
Eichengreen (2005) that each individual participant will realize that it stands to lose more 
if it holds pat than if it joins the run, when it comes to that.    Thus if we are relying on 
the economic interests of other countries, we cannot count on being bailed out 
indefinitely.     
 
If individual economic self-interest will not keep foreigners buying dollars 
indefinitely, might major foreign governments feel an obligation to do so on geopolitical 
grounds?   They did so in the 1960s, in part because the Soviet threat drew the Western 
allies together, which produced a degree of solidarity and cooperation (notwithstanding 
troublemaking by Charles DeGaulle) that is not in evidence today.   Even then, the 
Bretton Woods system broke down.    To recap the history, the day of reckoning implied 
by the Triffin Dilemma was in any case accelerated substantially by the expansionary U.S. 
fiscal and monetary policies of the Viet Nam War era, and the resulting widening of the 
balance of payments deficit.  International investors sold dollars.  In August 1971 the United 
States responded by unilaterally closing the official gold window and devaluing the dollar, 
thereby ending the Bretton Woods regime.  By March 1973, all the major industrialized 
countries had given up the effort to keep their currencies pegged to the dollar.   Central bank 
holdings of the yen and the mark rose rapidly in the remainder of the 1970s and 1980s 
(though the level still remained well behind the dollar for easily understood reasons). 
Over the last four decades, our allies have been willing to pay a financial price to 
support American leadership of the international economy, because they correctly saw it 
to be in their interests.   In the 1960s, Germany was willing to offset the expenses of 
stationing U.S. troops on bases there so as to save the United States from a balance of 
payments deficit.   The U.S. military has long been charged less to station troops in high-
rent Japan than if they had been based at home.   In 1991, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and a 
number of other countries were willing to pay for the financial cost of the war against 
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Iraq, thus temporarily wiping out the U.S. current account deficit for the only time in a 
twenty-year period. Repeatedly the Bank of Japan, among other central banks, has been 
willing to buy dollars to prevent the U.S. currency from depreciating (late 1960s, early 
1970s, late 1980s).  
During the same period that the United States has lost its budget surplus and the twin 
deficits have re-emerged, i.e., since 2001, we have also lost popular sympathy and 
political support in much of the rest of the world.29  In the past, deficits from imperial 
overstretch have been manageable because others have paid the bills for our troops 
overseas: Germany and Japan during the Cold War, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1991. 
Now the hegemon has lost its claim to legitimacy in the eyes of many. Next time the US 
asks other central banks to bail out the dollar, will they be as willing to do so as Europe 
was in the 1960s, or as Japan was in the late 1980s after the Louvre Agreement?  We fear 
not.   
 Our scenarios of dollar-euro rivalry are not meant to express an optimistic 
forecast regarding European economics or governance.  Europeans have made many 
mistakes, the leaders and public alike.  But so have Americans.    
 
Summary of conclusions 
 
 Predictions about scenarios under which the euro might in the future rival or 
surpass the dollar as the world’s leading international reserve currency are the major pay-
off of this paper. Several years ago, we thought the conditions that would produce a 
reversal of roles within the subsequent two decades were along the lines of either a 
scenario under which the United Kingdom joined EMU, which seems unlikely, or one in 
which the dollar continues to depreciate at the same rate as it had over 2001-04 (4 per 
cent per year, trade-weighted), presumably because US macroeconomic policies 
eventually undermine confidence in the value of the dollar.   Now, even with the UK out 
of EMU, if a fraction of London’s financial markets is counted as the home for euro 
transactions then, we find that the euro could overtake the dollar as early as 2015.    
 
 If the dollar does indeed lose its role as leading international currency, the cost to 
the US would probably extend beyond the simple loss of seignorage narrowly defined.   
We would lose the exorbitant privilege of playing banker to the world, accepting short-
term deposits at low interest rates in return for long-term investments at high average 
rates of return.    When combined with other political developments, it might even spell 
the end of economic and political hegemony.    These are century-long advantages that 
are not to be cast away lightly. 
 
 Most recent assessments of the sustainability and adjustment of the US current 
account feature substantial depreciation of the dollar in the future, whether adjustment 
then operates via expenditure-switching or a valuation effect.  Our results suggest that 
such dollar depreciation would be no free lunch, and could have profound consequences 
                                                 
29  In sharp contrast to international attitudes at the dawn of the century, the U.S. is now 
viewed unfavorably in most countries surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project.  
Other surveys give similar results. 
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for the international monetary system.   These consequences include the loss of the 
exorbitant privilege of easy financing of large US deficits, both government and national.  
The political influence that American policymakers have internationally, including in 
international institutions, could also be diminished.  
 
 If the euro were to overtake the dollar in a few decades, it would be a once-in-a-
century event.   But it happened to the pound in the last century, so who is to say it could 
not happen to the dollar in this? 
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Data Appendix 
 
Share is the proportion of currency holdings. GDPratio is the share of world GDP (evaluated at 
market exchange rates); Inflationdiff is the difference between a 5 year moving average of CPI 
inflation and industrialized country inflation; Exratevar is the trade weighted exchange rate 
volatility (monthly), measured as a 5 year moving average; Fxturnovertatio is turnover is daily 
turnover divided by total 5 center turnover.  
 
Reserve currency holdings. Official reserve holdings of member central banks, at end of  year. 
The data used is spliced version of Updated 2003 data obtained July 1, 2004 (for 1980 onward) to 
an unpublished data for 1965-2001. NA observations set to 0 except for the euro legacy 
currencies. Then, US dollar series is based on COFER data beginning at end-2004, while Euro 
series is based on COFER data beginning at end 1999. 70% of unallocated reserves are 
categorized as dollar reserves, while 25% are categorized as euro reserves. Note the 2007 entry is 
for 2007Q3. In logistic transformations, 0 entries set to 0.000001 (0.0001%). Sources: IMF 
Annual Reports, Table I.2, IMF unpublished data, and Currency Composition of Official Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (COFER) data, December 28, 2007 version. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm .  
 
Ratio of GDP to total World GDP. Ratio of GDP in USD (converted at official exchange rates) to 
GDP of world aggregate. Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and IMF, World 
Economic Outlook.   
 
Inflation. Calculated as log difference of monthly CPI, averaged. Five year moving average is 
centered. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Euro area inflation for 1980-1998 is 
ECB data from Alquist and Chinn (2002). Industrial country inflation from International 
Financial Statistics. 
 
Exchange rate volatility. Calculated as the standard deviation of the log first difference of the 
SDR exchange rate. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
Forex Turnover. 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from BIS Triennial Surveys. 
Billions of dollars of daily turnover, in April. Data from 1977-88 from G-30, NY Fed surveys, 
central bank surveys. Observations in-between survey years log-linearly interpolated. For 1973-
1979, interpolation using 1977-79 relationship.  
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